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Abstract 
What can governments do to encourage nonprofit hospitals to provide greater benefits to their 
communities? Recent efforts by the federal and state governments seek to hold hospitals accountable 
for community health, in part by incentivizing charity care provision. Laws that set benchmarks for 
charity care spending are increasingly used, but their efficacy is uncertain. In this study, we examine the 
extent to which Illinois’ minimum charity care provision (MCCP) law increases nonprofit hospital 
charity care. Importantly, we differentiate between responses for hospitals required to provide minimal 
charitable spending (nonprofits) and those that are not (for-profit and public). We use detailed panel 
(2009-2015) data from Illinois' Annual Hospital Questionnaire and county-level data from the 
American Community Survey. We exploit a discrete change in charitable care requirements for 
nonprofit hospitals to identify the effect of the MCCP law on charity care, controlling for hospital 
characteristics, county demographics, and year and county (or hospital) fixed effects. Employing a 
differences-in-differences model, we find no evidence that the MCCP law increases charity care on 
average. Instead, we find some evidence that the law’s effects vary by how much charity care hospitals 
provided previously – charity care increases for those providing lower levels at baseline, narrowing the 
gap in charity care provision with those that provide high levels at baseline. The results suggest that 
setting low benchmarks does not create sufficient incentives for nonprofit hospitals to provide greater 
charity care on average, but instead may narrow the gap between high and low charity care hospitals. 
JEL No.: I18, I11, H71 
Keywords: Minimum Charity Provision Laws, Nonprofit Hospitals, Charity Care 
Authors: Michah W. Rothbart, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public 
Affairs, Syracuse University; Nara Yoon, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse 
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1 
“Hospitals were built—mostly by churches—to be a safe haven for people regardless of one’s race, creed 
or ability to pay. Hospitals have a nonprofit status—most of them—for a reason. They’re supposed to be 
community institutions.” 
- Martin A. Makary, Professor of Surgery at Johns Hopkins Medicine, as quoted in McCambridge
(2019).
“You should get close to the value of tax exemption in community benefit. I think you’ll find most 
hospitals aren’t providing that.” 
- Paula Song, Associate Professor of Health Policy and Management at the University of North
Carolina Gillings School of Global Public Health as quoted in Rosenthal (2013).
Introduction 
What can governments do to hold nonprofit hospitals accountable for providing sufficient community 
benefits? While for-profit and government hospitals are large players in the U.S. healthcare market, 
approximately two-thirds of all hospitals are tax-exempt charitable organizations (American Hospital 
Association Survey 2019) with privileged tax status – they do not pay property taxes, and in some cases, 
sales taxes.1 This expensive tax expenditure is potentially justified by community health benefits offered 
by nonprofit hospitals, including charity care. Tax exemptions may help nonprofit hospitals support the 
hospitals’ missions through the provision of charity care (Sutton and Stensland 2004; Thorpe and Phelps 
1991). Governments and the public, therefore, increasingly seek to hold nonprofit hospitals accountable 
for their communities’ health to justify their tax-exemption benefits.  
1 Previous work estimates tax exemptions for charitable hospitals were $24.6 billion in 2011 (Rosenbaum et al. 2015). 
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Recent policies, including the Affordable Care Act (ACA), attempt to provide nonprofit 
hospitals with incentives to increase community benefits and to address broader community needs.2 Tax 
expenditures are an indirect government intervention intended to achieve public policy aspirations, but 
they only circuitously hold nonprofit organizations accountable for provision of services such as 
community health (see, for example, Musgrave and Musgrave 1980; Benjamin and Posner 2018; 
Howard 2002; Kettl 2002). Others have argued that providing tax benefits serves as an “implicit 
subsidy” (Sanders 1995) to nonprofit hospitals to support their public service missions, including charity 
care – but the incentive is often just an implicit and not an explicit requirement.  
Despite increasing attention to the theories of ownership and widespread use of federal and state 
legislation to address broader community health needs, research on the extent to which governments can 
encourage nonprofit hospitals to provide greater charity care is thin and mixed (Noble et al. 1998; Sutton 
and Stensland 2004; Kennedy et al. 2010). To fill this gap, we evaluate Illinois’ minimum charity care 
provision (MCCP) law to examine the conditions under which government policies can incentivize 
nonprofit hospitals’ provision of charity care. 
In 2012, Illinois “set the bar” for charity care spending at a level at least equal to the foregone 
property tax levy for a nonprofit hospital. By “setting the bar,” the government codified a target that 
nonprofit hospitals must meet or face consequences. The Illinois’ MCCP law raises fundamental 
questions for researchers and policymakers about policy effectiveness. An adequate evaluation of this 
type of policy will provide insights into whether a series of shifts in policies aimed at expanding nonprofit 
hospitals’ community obligations will have their intended positive effect on community health. The 
                                               
2 Tax-exempt hospitals spent an average of 7.5% of their expenditures on community benefits during the fiscal year 2009, of 
which, more than 85% was spent on charity care, government payer payment shortfalls, and subsidized health services (Young 
et al. 2013). 
3 
 
effects may also have considerable consequences for equity, depending on which patients benefit from 
these policies.  
In this paper, we assess the extent to which Illinois’ MCCP law increases the provision of charity 
care in nonprofit hospitals, comparing the effects of the law in nonprofit hospitals to hospitals not subject 
to the requirements (for-profits and government). We provide evidence on the extent to which and 
conditions under which government policies increase charity care provided in nonprofit hospitals. We 
explore which hospitals increase charity care, presumably because they receive sufficient incentives to 
further fulfill their missions. We use difference-in-differences models and longitudinal, hospital-level data 
on general hospitals in Illinois (nonprofit, for-profit, and public) from 2009-2015 to estimate the impact 
of Illinois’ MCCP law on charity care provided. Our sample is comprised of hospital data from Illinois’ 
Annual Hospital Questionnaire and county-level data from the American Community Survey, including 
demographic, fiscal, and geographic information on 105 general hospitals with audited financial 
statements. We focus on impacts for two key outcomes: (1) percentage of patients receiving charity 
care, and (2) percentage of health services spent on charity care.  
In brief, we find nonprofit and government hospitals provide more charity care than for-profit 
hospitals before the MCCP policy. Impact estimates on the effects of the policy, however, show little 
evidence that the MCCP law increases charity care provision. Instead, we find some evidence that the 
law’s effects vary by how much charity care hospitals previously provided – charity care increases for 
those providing lower levels at baseline, narrowing the gap in charity care provision with those that 
provide high levels at baseline. These findings, taken together, provide new insights for the ongoing 
debate on the effectiveness of government policies designed to incentivize hospitals’ provision of charity 
care, and what makes for effective accountability policy for nonprofits more broadly.  
4 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we outline the policy context, 
including recent government activity intended to increase hospitals’ provision of charity care. In the third 
section, we review relevant literature on the link between hospital ownership and charity care, and 
government policies intended to encourage hospitals to be accountable for community health. In the 
fourth section, we discuss our data and measures followed by a section outlining our empirical strategy. 
Finally, we show results followed by comments and conclusions. 
Policy Context: Regulatory Approaches to Hold Nonprofit Hospitals 
Accountable for Charity Care 
In the hospital sector, nonprofit hospitals play an outsize role and governments have begun to explore a 
variety of policies intended to hold them accountable (Sanders 1993; Sutton and Stensland 2004; Noble 
et al., 1998). Recent policy approaches, in the era of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), attempt to hold 
nonprofit hospitals accountable for increased provision of community benefits and address broader 
community needs. Although there is a wide range of activities that could be considered beneficial to a 
community, previous studies have typically used “uncompensated care” and “charity care.” For instance, 
“uncompensated care” includes charity care, bad debt, and shortfalls in government-sponsored care 
(such as Medicare and Medicaid), while “charity care” refers to the unbilled expenditures for 
disadvantaged patients when the determination to provide care free of charge is made before the medical 
services are provided (see, for example, Thorpe and Phelps 1991; Herzlinger and Krasker 1987; 
Nicholson et al. 2000).  
Although myriad potential laws may increase and enforce community benefit standards, we 
focus on the two most common policies – (1) reporting requirements, and (2) minimum charity care 
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provision (MCCP) laws. Together, these two policy efforts are aimed at increasing accountability for tax-
exempt hospitals with respect to community benefit activities.   
Laws with reporting requirements may compel hospitals to report the levels and types of 
community benefits and charity care provided.3 These policies provide positive signals for generous 
hospitals that provide high levels of charity care or, alternatively, publicly shame those that do not.4 We 
call laws with reporting requirements “gold starring” policies. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2009 (ACA) has a few features consistent with gold starring policies. The ACA mandated public 
reporting of community benefit activities to improve standardization and transparency. 5 One key 
feature of these reporting requirements was the new Schedule H, which was added for hospitals in 2009 
to supplement financial data collected from all tax-exempt organizations on the IRS Form 990.6 In 
addition to information on hospital activities, policies, and bad debt, the ACA also requires all nonprofit 
hospitals in the U.S. (with over $50,000 in revenues) to report on community benefits, including charity 
care, on the Schedule H each year. Failure to meet federal requirements may yield significant 
disadvantages, ranging from an annual $50,000 excise tax to revocation of the hospital’s 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt status (IRS instructions 2015). The major categories of federal community benefit requirements 
found in the ACA and the IRS, however, do not specify a minimum level of charity care that a hospital 
                                               
3 Currently, 31 states require nonprofit hospitals to comply with community benefit reporting laws 
(https://hilltopinstitute.org/our-work/hospital-community-benefit/hcbp-state-comparison/). 
4 Similar policies that aim to encourage behavior through sharing information are common in other areas of regulation, 
including food safety compliance (Jin and Leslie 2003, 2009; Rothbart et al. 2019) and education (Figlio and Lucas 2004; 
Rockoff and Turner 2010). 
5 Section 9007 of the ACA established “additional requirements for charitable hospitals” in the 
new I.R.C. §501(r), which standardizes community benefit reporting for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt hospitals and establishes 
specific requirements that these hospitals must meet as a condition of preserving their federal tax exemption. Further, the 
ACA established new standards for community health needs assessment, financial assistance policies, and hospital charges, 
billing, and collection practices.  
6 IRS Schedule H data in tax year 2013 suggests that 11.7% of total spending in nonprofit hospitals goes to community 
benefits including “free or discounted care, Medicaid underpayments, health research, education, bad debt expense 
attributable to patients eligible for financial assistance, Medicare shortfalls, and other community benefits and building 
activities” (AHA report, 2017). 
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must provide in return for tax-exempt status. Ambiguity in federal standards for charity care may 
partially explain limited and mixed research on the extent to which governments can influence the level 
of the community benefits provided by nonprofit hospitals (Morrisey et al. 1996; Kennedy et al. 2010).  
Conversely, Minimum Charity Care Provision (MCCP) laws7 further regulate nonprofit hospitals 
by imposing compliance criteria with a threat of eliminating tax exemption status. These policies “set the 
bar,” requiring nonprofit hospitals to provide charity care at or above a set threshold (typically 
determined by the size of foregone tax burden) in order to retain their tax exemptions. As of 2019, five 
states have MCCP laws8 (Illinois, Texas, Utah, Pennsylvania, Nevada), which are typically enforced by 
threat of removal of tax exemptions. Illinois passed its MCCP law in 2012. There, hospitals can lose both 
property tax and sales tax exemptions if they fail to comply with the MCCP requirements, providing a 
very strong financial incentive. While privileged tax status can be thought of as a carrot for provision of 
services that serve the public interest, removal of tax exemptions through a MCCP law might be a 
powerful stick to incentivize behavior.9 This study offers an empirical investigation of the impact of the 
Illinois’ MCCP law on hospitals’ charity care provision.  
                                               
7 Illinois Property Tax Code, S.B. 2194, codified at 35 ILCS 200/15-86(c)(2012). 
8 The legal requirements for vary by state (https://hilltopinstitute.org/our-work/hospital-community-benefit/hcbp-state-
comparison/). 
9 Prior to the implementation of Illinois’ MCCP law, two hospitals, Riverside Medical Center and Provena Covenant Medical 
Center, were threatened with loss of tax exemptions due to allegedly failing to offer sufficient benefit to the public interest. 
The Illinois Department of Revenue revoked Provena Covenant Medical Center’s property tax-exemption status in 2004 
because of alleged inadequacy of its charitable activity (Barniv et al. 2005; Provena Covenant Med. Cent. v. Dep. Rev. 236 
III. 2d 368 (2010)). The lawsuits signaled to hospitals that they should take Illinois’ community benefits requirements 
seriously and that the Department of Revenue might aggressively enforce future requirements. The MCCP law was a response 
to Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in the Provena Covenant Medical Center case, setting a standardized and transparent 
benchmark.   
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Literature Review 
In this paper, we build on previous research that examines the extent to which governments can hold 
nonprofit hospitals accountable for provision of community benefits, focusing on the extent to which 
MCCP policies increase charity care spending and exploring potential mechanisms. We investigate two 
issues, including sectoral differences in the provision of hospital charity care and the role of government 
policies to increase charity care, especially focusing on MCCP laws.  
First, theories of sectoral difference are widely used to understand the relationship between 
ownership and organizational performance in public administration research (Heinrich 2009; Herzlinger 
and Krasker 1987; Bozeman and Bretschneider 1994; Rainey and Bozeman 2000; Perry and Rainey 
1988). Although evidence suggests that sectoral difference is related to health service provisions in 
markets where public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations compete (Amirkhanyan et al. 2008; 
Amirkhanyan et al. 2017; Weisbrod and Schlesinger 1986; Johansen and Zhu 2013; Hansmann 1987; 
Ben‐Ner and Van Hoomissen 1991), work is inconclusive on the relationship between hospital 
ownership type and the level of charity care provided (or community benefits, more broadly) in the 
absence of government incentives. For instance, some studies find that nonprofit hospitals provide 
greater levels of community benefit and charity care than for-profit hospitals (Arrington and Haddock 
1990; Clement et al. 2002). Others, however, find little evidence that nonprofit hospitals provide 
community benefits and charity care at higher rates than for-profits (Schneider 2007; Schneider and 
Yilmaz 2013; Bazzoli et al. 2010).  
Second, public administration researchers have long tried to understand the role government 
policy can play in shaping the accountability of the third-party actors in the nonprofit sector (Romzek 
and Johnston 2005; Salamon 1995; Posner 2002; Bardach and Lesser 1996). There are a variety of tools 
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available to public administrators to hold third parties accountable for the delivery of services that are in 
the public interest (Dicke and Ott 1999; Johnston and Romzek 1999; Dubnick and Frederickson 2009; 
Van Slyke 2006). 
One such policy, charity care reporting policies, require hospitals to report levels of charitable 
activities provided to the community. Research on the extent to which charity care reporting policies can 
influence the size of the community benefits provided by nonprofit hospitals is thin and mixed. For 
example, some studies find that nonprofit hospitals increase community benefits in response to the 
reporting policy requirements (Young et al. 2013; Hellinger 2009; Gray and Schlesinger 2009; Ginn and 
Moseley 2006), while other studies find that the policies do not significantly affect the provision of 
community benefits (Schneider 2007; Bazzoli et al. 2010). 
More relevant to our paper, other policies such as MCCP laws, set a target benchmark for the 
provision of one particular community benefit, charity care. Two previous studies examine the 
effectiveness of MCCP laws per se, both of which assess the law in Texas and neither of which find that 
minimum thresholds increase charity care spending (Kennedy et al. 2010; Sutton and Stensland 2004). 
Note, however, that these studies are limited because they do not have a counterfactual group to follow 
over time. The samples in previous MCCP research include only nonprofit hospitals, which are all 
required to comply with MCCP laws. A key limitation, therefore, is that their findings may merely indicate 
sector changes over time. The pre-post designs might be biased by alternative contemporaneous changes 
in policy that affect charity care provision.  
The underlying assumption of Kennedy et al. (2010), for example, is that nonprofits that already 
provide sufficient charity care are not subject to the MCCP law and keep charity care the same. This is, 
however, an empirical question. Nonprofit hospitals may respond differently to the treatment if they 
provide high levels of charity care prior to policy implementation, but they may well still be treated in 
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some way. Further complicating matters, it is unclear, a priori, which direction the bias may go. Previous 
research on MCCP laws may under or overestimate the impacts of MCCP depending on whether 
nonprofits already “above the bar” respond to the law by increasing, decreasing, or keeping charity care 
the same. Including other, untreated hospitals, such as government and for-profits, would improve the 
analysis by offering a counterfactual for comparison. Our study fills this gap by including hospitals with 
all ownership types (nonprofit, for-profit, government) and comparing charity care provided by all three 
ownership types over time.  
Data and measures 
To examine the effectiveness of Illinois’ MCCP laws, we merge hospital financial, size, and demographic 
data from Illinois’ Annual Hospital Questionnaire (AHQ) with county data from the Census Bureau’s 
American Community Survey (ACS). AHQ is collected by Illinois Health Facilities and Services Review 
Board from 2009 to 2015. The AHQ provides data on all hospitals operating in Illinois, including hospital 
characteristics, financial information, ownership, specialty, and financial audit status. Our analytic sample 
includes all general hospitals with audited financial statements for years 2009-2015. To address 
concerns about hospital closures during this period, we initially restrict the sample to continuously 
operating (in every year) hospitals for 2009-2015. Our sample includes 733 observations of 105 
hospitals over the 7-year period.10 
Our main outcome of interest is levels of charity care provided. While there are many potential 
measures of charity care provision, we rely on the two measures discussed most frequently in the existing 
literature: (1) percentage of patients receiving charity care, and (2) percentage of health services spent 
on charity care. Our main independent variable is a binary interaction variable that takes a value of 1 for 
                                               
10 2 observations are excluded out of 735 total hospital-year observations due to missing outcome data. 
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nonprofit hospitals in the post-policy period (2012-2015) and 0 otherwise. “Hospital and financial 
characteristics” is a vector of variables that reflect the number of patients, number of beds, and natural 
logarithm of revenue (in 2015 dollars using the consumer price index, CPI). Number of patients includes 
total number of people receiving inpatient and outpatient care from the hospital. Number of beds 
measures the authorized bed capacity of each hospital as licensed by Illinois’ Department of Public 
Health. We use total revenues earned from inpatient and outpatient care to capture hospital size and 
financial productivity, taking the natural logarithm to address skewness of earnings data. 
The ACS includes information on county socio-demographic characteristics, which are important 
considerations for hospitals deciding on the provision of charity care (Hsieh et al. 2010). “County 
characteristics” is a vector of variables including population, income, gender, age group, race and 
ethnicity, foreign-born population, English-speaking ability, education, poverty, and unemployment. 
Population is the number of residents in the county. Income captures county per capita income. Gender 
captures share female. Age group captures share of population that are children (under 18) and senior 
citizens (over 65). Race is a vector of variables that reflect the share who are white, black, and other 
races. Ethnicity includes the share of the county population that is Hispanic. Foreign-born population 
reflects the share of county residents born outside the U.S. English-speaking ability is the share of the 
population who speak English “less than very well”. Education is a vector of variables that reflect 
population educational attainment (share less than high school, high school, some college, bachelors, and 
graduate). We measure poverty as the county poverty rate and unemployment as the unemployment 
rate. 
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Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for hospital characteristics and the county characteristics faced by 
general hospitals in 2009. Nonprofit hospitals are larger than the for-profit and government hospitals, 
earning more revenue and serving more patients. Nonprofits are also the most common ownership type 
among general hospitals (80 out of 105 in the sample). There are more general government hospitals 
than for-profits, but the government hospitals in Illinois are smaller, on average. Nonprofit hospitals 
provide greater levels of charity care, on average, spending a higher share on charity care and serving a 
higher share of charity care patients.  
[Table 1] 
Hospitals in our analytic sample locate in 58 counties, which comprises over half of all Illinois 
counties (102 total). For-profit hospitals operate in the largest counties, followed by nonprofit and then 
government hospitals. For-profit hospitals operate in counties with greater black and Hispanic 
populations, higher shares who speak English less than very well, and high levels of educational 
attainment and per capita income.  
We exclude hospitals with specializations (i.e. children’s specialty, psychiatric, and 
rehabilitation) and those with unaudited financial statements. These hospitals are generally, large and 
provide high levels of charity care. The hospitals in our analytic sample locate in counties with smaller 
populations and lower per capita income, as compared to excluded hospitals. Our sample’s counties are 
whiter and less Hispanic.  
Empirical strategy 
We use a variety of panel data methods to estimate the effect of Illinois’ MCCP law on charity care 
provided. First, we estimate differences across sectors before the MCCP law and then compare the 
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difference in those differences over time.11 That is, we compare the effects of the MCCP law on hospitals 
subject to its requirements (nonprofits) and not subject to requirements (public and for-profits), 
exploiting the discrete change in charitable care requirements for nonprofit hospitals (“setting the bar”). 
We control for hospital characteristics, county demographics, and year and county (or hospital) fixed 
effects. As an important contribution, we differentiate between responses for hospitals required to 
maintain minimal charitable spending (nonprofits) and those that are not (for-profit and government).  
Further, we bring in a rich set of county control covariates to characterize the demographic, fiscal, 
and geographic environment of hospitals. County controls are preferred to hospital demographic 
controls, because the characteristics of patients a hospital serves may be endogenous – a hospital that 
provides charity care may lead to the hospital serving more poor patients or patients with certain racial 
backgrounds (see, for example, Norton and Staiger 1994).  
Our empirical strategy relies on a key identifying assumption: that the MCCP law targeting 
nonprofit  hospitals does not affect government or for-profit hospitals’ charity care. While previous 
research finds a link between hospital ownership type and the level of charity care provided (Schneider 
2007; Ferris and Graddy 1999), this could be confounded by other differences across the hospitals. 
Instead, we focus on the changes in charity care that occur contemporaneously with the MCCP law, 
holding other hospital and county characteristics constant.12 We leverage that identifying assumption to 
better test the effectiveness of these laws. 
                                               
11 Existing studies that examined the charity care are limited because they cannot adequately control for other differences 
between nonprofit, for-profit, and government hospitals. For example, ownership of hospitals vary by specialty, location, size, 
history of incorporation and expansion, debt holdings, annual profitability, among many others. That is, previous work on the 
extent to which nonprofit hospitals “earn” their tax exemption is largely descriptive research and potentially confounded by 
omitted variables. In particular, previous research suffers from “admiring the problem”, instead of proposing ways in which to 
increase the provision of charity care in hospitals. We address this issue by including all types of hospital ownership in this 
paper. 
12 For-profit hospitals are eligible for an income tax credit equal to the lesser of real property taxes paid during the tax year or 
the cost of free and discounted services provided [Section 35 ILCS 5/223(a), Illinois Income Tax Act, 2012]. 
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First, we begin with a model of the relationship between hospital ownership and charity care 
provision prior to the MCCP law (2009-2011), controlling for a variety of hospital, county, patient, and 
period characteristics: 
(1) 𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 +  𝑋𝑋′ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽3 + 𝐶𝐶′ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽4 + 𝜉𝜉𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
where ℎ indexes hospital, 𝑐𝑐 indexes county, and 𝑡𝑡 indexes year; 𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  is a vector of two outcomes that 
capture the rate of charity care provided by hospital h in year t, measured as either: (1) charity care 
patients as share of all patients, or (2) charity care spending as a share of revenue plus charity care 
spending; 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  takes a value of 1 for a nonprofit hospital and 0 otherwise; 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  takes a value of 1 for 
a for-profit hospital and 0 otherwise; government hospitals serve as the reference category; 𝑋𝑋′ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  is a 
vector of hospital and financial characteristics including number of patients, number of beds, and natural 
the logarithm of revenue (in 2015 dollars using the consumer price index, CPI); 𝐶𝐶′ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  is a vector of county 
characteristics including population, per capita income, and share by age group (under 18 and over 65), 
gender, race and ethnicity, foreign-born population, English-speaking ability, educational attainment, 
poverty status, and unemployed;13 𝜉𝜉𝑐𝑐  is a year fixed effect; and 𝜀𝜀ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  is an error term. In alternative 
models, we add county fixed effects to control for unobserved differences across counties. Standard 
errors are clustered at the hospital level. 𝛽𝛽1 (𝛽𝛽2) capture the pre-policy difference in the provision of 
charity care between government hospitals and nonprofit (for-profit) hospitals, holding other factors of 
the hospital including size, location, demographics, and revenues constant.  
                                               
13 In alternative specifications, we include the demographic characteristics of patients, including race and ethnicity, in lieu of 
county demographic characteristics. Results are consistent, which suggests our findings are robust to alternative measures of 
the populations served. Results available upon request of authors. 
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We examine the effect of MCCP, estimating the extent to which MCCP increases (or decreases) 
nonprofit hospitals’ charity care provision. Our preferred models include controls for hospital and county 
characteristics in addition to county fixed effects. 
(2) 𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑋𝑋′ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽4 + 𝐶𝐶′ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽5 + 𝜉𝜉𝑐𝑐 + 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  
where all variables are as previously defined, and 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐  is a binary interaction variable that 
captures nonprofit hospitals in the post-policy period (2012-2015).14 The coefficient of interest, 𝛽𝛽2 on 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 , captures the MCCP effect on nonprofit hospitals’ charity care provision. Preferred 
models include year fixed-effects and county fixed-effects, 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 , to control for unobserved differences 
across counties. We also test robustness to pooled analyses and include hospital fixed effects in lieu of 
county fixed effects.15 Again, standard errors clustered at hospital level. Our key coefficient is 𝛽𝛽2, which 
captures the effect of the MCCP law on hospitals’ charity care provision. These are our core analyses, 
which rely on more plausible identifying assumptions than previous studies. We estimate the first 
difference as differences in charity care provided across hospital ownership type (nonprofit, for-profit, 
government), but focus our interpretation on the difference in those differences that follow the MCCP 
law. That is, our key assumption is that the difference between ownership sectors would have remained 
consistent over time if not for the policy.  
 We then test our identifying assumptions in three ways. First, we estimate the linear trend 
between nonprofit hospitals and charity care in the three years prior to the MCCP law as a test of the 
parallel trends assumption. That is, we test whether the relationship between ownership and charity care 
is constant prior to the policy change. Second, we run a placebo test, setting a fake post-policy variable 
                                               
14 We exclude the variable 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 , because it is collinear with year fixed effects. 
15 County fixed effects are collinear with hospital fixed effects and are excluded in hospital fixed effects models. Hospitals 
rarely change ownership type, so coefficients on nonprofit and for-profit are nearly, but not perfectly, collinear with hospital 
fixed effects in these models.  
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equal to 1 in the year prior to MCCP adoption. For both the first and the second test, null results suggest 
that the identifying assumptions are valid. Third, we conduct an event study analysis. We test the 
relationship between ownership type and charity care in every year to determine whether changes in that 
relationship coincide with the MCCP law. Our non-parametric event study specifications also assess the 
parallel trends assumption. We add annual interactions between nonprofit and year, centered on the year 
of MCCP adoption.  
(3) 𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽𝛽1 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐′ ∗ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  𝛽𝛽2 +  𝛽𝛽3 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 +  𝑋𝑋′ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽4 + 𝐶𝐶′ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽5 +  𝜉𝜉𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  
where all variables are as previously defined, and 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐  is a vector of indicators reflecting the 
number of years before and after MCCP adoption.16 𝛽𝛽2 captures differences in the relationship between 
nonprofit hospitals’ charity care over time, where the secular trend is estimated using for-profit and 
government hospitals. Coefficients that are indistinguishable from 0 before the policy provide evidence 
that the parallel trends assumption is credible. Estimates that are statically significant post-policy indicate 
that the MCCP law changes charity care provided by nonprofit hospitals. The year before the policy – 
2011 – serves as the reference year. Again, standard errors are clustered at the hospital level.  
Finally, we explore potential heterogeneity based on levels of charity care provided before the 
MCCP law. We split nonprofit hospitals into three terciles – the top, middle, and bottom third of 
nonprofit hospitals– based on average share of revenues spent on charity care in the pre-study period 
(from 2006 to 2008).17 We fix nonprofit hospitals to their tercile group and estimate charity care over 
time to assess whether the impact of MCCP varies by the levels of charity care provided before Illinois 
                                               
16 That is, for example, 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀1  = 1 in 2013 and 0 in any other year, 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑌𝑌𝑀𝑀−1 = 1 in 2011 and 0 in any other year, etc. 
17 We think that using the average charity care during the pre-study period (from 2006 to 2008) best reflects hospitals’ 
“propensity” to provide charity care in the absence of MCCP. Using observations in sample to construct terciles may suffer 
from regression to the mean, such that differences across hospitals narrow simply due to mechanical statistical artifacts rather 
than changing underlying behavior. Alternatively, we use data in the first year of the panel (2009) to assign nonprofit hospitals 
to the three terciles based on charity care provided in the first observation year – the results are similar, but, again, may reflect 
regression to the means rather than effects of MCCP.  
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“set the bar.” The “top tercile” includes nonprofit hospitals in the top third of charity care provision 
(above 1.82% of health services spent on charity care) and the “bottom tercile” are those at the bottom 
(below 1.29%). “Middle tercile” are nonprofit hospitals providing charity care in any amount between 
the top and bottom (above 1.29% and below 1.82% of health services spent on charity care). 
Why do we suspect responses may vary? In particular, nonprofit hospitals at the bottom of the 
charity care distribution may need to increase charity care just to meet the new benchmark levels. 
Alternatively, hospitals at the top of the charity care distribution may not need to increase their charity 
care. Instead, perhaps a formalized “bar” may enable these hospitals to decrease charity care provision 
without fear of penalty. Grouping by charity care terciles in the estimation model allows us to expand 
upon results from models 2 and 3, differentiating between nonprofit hospitals that provide high and low 
levels of charity care relative to their peers in the years before MCCP.  
Analysis and results 
Our OLS results are shown in Table 2, showing the relationship between ownership type and charity care 
before MCCP. Descriptively, nonprofit hospitals provide more charity care than government hospitals, 
on average. Column 3 of Table 2, which includes controls for county demographic and hospital 
characteristics, suggests that nonprofit  hospitals serve 1.578 percentage points greater share of patients 
with charity care than do government hospitals. Column 7 suggests that nonprofits spend 1.014 
percentage points more of their revenues on charity care than do government hospitals.18 This 
relationship is, however, entirely driven by differences in the locations of nonprofit and government 
hospitals. Nonprofit hospitals that are located in the same counties as government hospitals serve about 
                                               
18 Results from columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, which control for substantially fewer potential confounders, are consistent in direction 
and magnitudes.  
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the same share of charity care patients (0.005 percentage points less) and actually spend somewhat less 
(0.980 percentage points) of their hospital revenues on charity care patients, as shown in columns 4 and 
8, respectively. For example, nonprofit has positive and significant coefficients in columns 5 to 7, 
showing results from models that do not include county fixed effects. Conversely, nonprofit has a 
negative, significant coefficient in column 8 (a model that includes county fixed effects). That is, 
nonprofit hospitals that operate in the same county as government hospitals provide less charity care 
than their counterpart, on average. 
[Table 2] 
For-profit hospitals provide less charity care than nonprofits to an even greater degree. Column 
3 of Table 2, shows that nonprofit hospitals serve 3.064 percentage points greater share of patients with 
charity care than do for-profit hospitals. Column 7 suggests that nonprofits spend 2.162 percentage 
points more of their revenues on charity care than do for-profit hospitals.19 Unlike the relationship with 
government hospitals, however, this relationship does not appear to be driven by differences in the 
locations of hospitals. Nonprofit hospitals that are located in the same counties as for-profit hospitals 
serve a greater share of charity care patients (3.719 percentage points; though this is imprecisely 
estimated) and spend more of their hospital revenues on charity care patients (2.519 percentage points), 
as shown in columns 4 and 8, respectively. 
Table 3 shows results of our difference-in-differences models, which all indicate that the policy 
had little or no effect on average charity care provision in nonprofit hospitals. All results show that the 
interaction between nonprofit hospital and treatment (𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) is small and insignificant. Columns 1 
through 5 indicate that there is no relationship between the MCCP policy and the share of patients 
                                               
19 Results from columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, which control for substantially fewer potential confounders, are consistent in direction 
and largely consistent in magnitudes (though perhaps becoming a little stronger in preferred models).  
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receiving charity care in nonprofit hospitals. Columns 6 through 10 indicate that there is no relationship 
between the MCCP policy and the ratio of revenues spent on charity care in nonprofit hospitals. The 
result is robust to inclusion of additional controls, county fixed effects and hospital fixed effects. Taken 
together, these results indicate that the policy was unsuccessful, on average, because the MCCP law did 
not increase charity care provided in nonprofits. 
[Table 3] 
 We test the key model assumptions in Table 4. Columns 1, 2, 6, and 7 show results of tests of the 
parallel trends assumptions, finding no significant trend prior to policy implementation in 2012 (point 
estimates, if they are to be believed, despite insignificance, suggest a small increase in charity care over 
time). Columns 3 to 5 and Columns 8 to 10 show tests of the assumption that there are no effects prior 
to treatment, showing statistically insignificant positive coefficients if we assign “treatment” to the year 
before MCCP.  
[Table 4] 
 We then turn to event study results to further test the parallel trends assumption and assess the 
extent to which impacts change over time. The results are shown graphically in Figure 1 panels A and B, 
with point estimates displayed as dots and 95% confidence intervals shown as lines (coefficients shown 
in tabular form are displayed in Appendix 2). The results provide little evidence of changes in the 
relationship between nonprofit and charity care prior to the MCCP law. The only statistically significant 
point estimate indicates that nonprofit hospitals spent relatively less on charity care in 2009 than they 
do in the year just prior to the policy change (panel B, year 2009). Moreover, the results provide no 
evidence that charity care increases in nonprofits concurrently with or after adoption of the MCCP law. 
That is, there is no evidence that the MCCP law worked, on average. In fact, the trends for both charity 
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care outcomes are negative (but statistically insignificant) after 2013. Like the difference-in-differences 
estimates, these results suggest that, if anything, the MCCP law decreased average charity care provided 
by nonprofits. This finding is somewhat stronger, but still only suggestive, in the event studies. 
[Figure 1 Panel A and B] 
 Next, we break apart the nonprofit effect by how much charity care the hospitals provided 
before the sample period. Here, we calculate charity care spending as a share of revenues for nonprofit 
hospitals between years 2006 and 2008. Then, we rank nonprofit hospitals by charity care provided, 
breaking them into terciles based on whether they rank in the top third, middle third, or bottom third of 
charity care spending. By construction, those in the top third provide more charity care prior to the policy, 
but the persistence of this effect across model specifications (and outcome variables) is notable. If charity 
care provision each year were “random” then these estimates would be statistically indistinguishable 
because the terciles are constructed out of the sample. Instead, the ordinal nature of the coefficients for 
NP_top, NP_middle, and NP_bottom suggest that some nonprofit hospitals have a greater “innate” 
proclivity for charity care than others, even among general hospitals and holding revenues, size, and 
county characteristics constant. 
In terms of the impact of MCCP, we observe substantial heterogeneity (especially for the 
spending outcome). The point estimates indicate that hospitals in the top tercile prior to 2009 actually 
decrease charity care spending in response to MCCP (though all estimates are statistically insignificant). 
Conversely, nonprofit hospitals in the bottom tercile increase charity care, and the result is statistically 
significant for charity care spending (for share of patients receiving charity care, the result is consistent, 
but statistically insignificant). As a result of these two trends, the gap between the top and bottom 
nonprofit hospitals narrows substantially after adoption of the MCCP policy. In 2009, there is a 2.9 
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percentage point gap in share of patients receiving charity care between the top and bottom terciles of 
nonprofit hospitals. By 2015 that gap is less than 1.3 percentage points. Similarly, the gap in the share of 
revenues spent on charity care falls from over 2.2 percentage points to 1.2. Narrowing differences 
between nonprofit hospitals that provide charity care well above the bar and nonprofit hospitals that 
provide charity care well below the bar is one of our most persistent results. Nonprofit hospitals in the 
middle of the distribution do not change charity care spending very much in either direction. We further 
calculate the impact of MCCP on the gaps between the terciles. For all comparisons, estimates indicate 
that MCCP decreased the gap between hospitals predisposed to provide more charity care and those 
predisposed to provide less. 
[Table 5] 
Finally, we return to an event study framework to better understand timing. Results, shown 
graphically in Figure 2 panels A and B (in tabular form in Appendix 3), suggest that the gap between high 
and low charity care non-profits does not narrow in the period before MCCP, but does substantially after.  
[Figure 2 Panel A and B] 
Beginning with Panel A, in 2009, the gap between the top tercile and the bottom tercile is 2.9 percentage 
points and remains about the same until 2011 (2.6 percentage points). Following the MCCP law, 
however, the gap narrows, both by the intended effect of those at the bottom increasing charity care and 
by those at the top decreasing. By 2015, the gap between top and bottom is only 1.3 percentage 
points20. Hospitals in the middle tercile respond like an average of the two, perhaps more closely 
resembling the top tercile.  
                                               
20 The event studies also suggests that hospitals in the bottom tercile respond quickly to the policy, increasing charity care in 
the first two years following implementation (2012 and 2013) and keeping charity care near the new levels thereafter. 
Conversely, the top tercile initially remains the same or even increases charity care in 2012 and 2013, but then begins a steep 
decline, perhaps once the hospitals notice that the bar set is not binding for them. 
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 Panel B of Figure 2 shows a similar pattern. All nonprofit hospitals slowly increase charity care 
relative to government and for-profit hospitals in the pre-period (though this trend is very similar across 
the nonprofit sector and statistically insignificant for all three terciles). Then, nonprofit hospitals in the 
bottom tercile increase charity care further in 2012 and 2013, followed by leveling off of the policy 
impact. Conversely, the top and middle terciles of nonprofits increase charity care spending at a more 
moderate pace in 2012 and 2013, followed by steep declines in 2014 and 2015. Taken together, the 
charity care spending gap in nonprofit hospitals falls from 2.2 percentage points in 2009 to just 1.2 
percentage points in 2015.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we explore the effectiveness of MCCP laws to shed light on the effectiveness of policies 
that set standards for minimal service delivery to hold nonprofit hospitals accountable for provision of 
health services to communities. We find no evidence that the MCCP law increased the average charity 
care provided by nonprofit hospitals. Instead, we find substantial evidence that the MCCP law closed 
gaps in charity care provision within the nonprofit sector: it increased charity care provided among 
nonprofit hospitals offering low levels prior to the policy, and decreased it in nonprofit hospitals who 
offer high levels of charity care at baseline. In ancillary analyses, we reaffirm previous research, finding 
nonprofit (and public) hospitals provide more charity care than for-profit hospitals in the absence of 
MCCP (consistent with Arrington and Haddock 1990 and Clement et al. 2002). Results are robust to 
alternative specifications and samples, including models with and without county (or hospital) fixed 
effects, a panel with all Illinois hospitals (not just general hospitals with audited financial statements), and 
a longer panel (2006–2015, using hospital demographic controls in lieu of county characteristics), 
22 
 
among many others. Tests of the parallel trends assumption and a placebo test using a false policy start 
date suggest the inferences we draw from the difference-in-differences models are warranted.  
There are important limitations to our analysis. We were not able to take into account other 
factors such as Medicaid and Medicare that might affect charity care provision. Increases in Medicare 
and Medicaid coverage and fees for service payments may alleviate the burden of charity care required 
from the hospitals. For example, there is evidence to suggest that recent policy efforts to increase access 
to Medicaid coverage could result in reducing levels of uncompensated care (Hsieh et al. 2010). As 
another example, research shows that hospitals experiencing price pressures from Medicare and 
Medicaid (Mann et al. 1995) or managed care firms (Gruber 1994) decrease their provision of charity 
care relative to other hospitals. Given increased competitive pressures leads to profit-seeking behaviors 
and reduced charity care among hospitals, we cannot speak to whether hospitals in the state or individual 
counties are providing sufficient charity care in later years (Gruber 1994; Keeler, Melnick and Zwanziger 
1999; Sloan 2000). 
Furthermore, we use charity care data reported through the AHQ and not MCCP forms returned 
by hospitals to the State each year. On the one hand, this serves as a disadvantage, because our charity 
care metric might miss important community benefit activities. On the other hand, this enables us to 
establish a secular charity care trend using data on all types of hospitals (government, for-profit, 
nonprofit), which is not available on MCCP forms or in earlier studies.  
Despite these limitations, this paper provides important empirical evidence on the efficacy of 
recent accountability policies that set target benchmarks for nonprofit hospitals. One thing for 
policymakers to consider is why the MCCP law does not appear to work. Here, policy context is quite 
relevant. Prior to the MCCP law in Illinois, the charity care requirements for nonprofit hospitals were 
aspirational and ambiguous. Nonprofit hospitals were expected to provide charity care and other 
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community benefits to the best of their ability (Provena Covenant Med. Cent. v. Dep. Rev. 236 III. 2d 
368 (2010)). The precise way the State decided to hold nonprofit hospitals accountable for their “best” 
or their “ability” was unclear. Moreover, threats of removal of tax exemption status for hospitals (such as 
Provena and others) served as a warning to hospitals to take actions demonstrating their commitment to 
meet this aspiration, even if the standards were not clearly or uniformly applied.  
In contrast, the MCCP law set a low accountability benchmark that was transparent. While 
nonprofit hospitals were required to provide a certain level of charity care relative to their earnings and 
foregone property tax burden, most of the hospitals were already providing greater levels of charity care 
than required. In fact, a handful provided substantially more. By defining the accountability benchmark 
and clarifying expectations, the policy may have unintentionally undermined the incentives for hospitals 
already exceeding the (previously tacit) expectations for nonprofits.  
We find that explicit quantitative standards can result in unintended consequences when an 
accountability policy sets low benchmarks. While hospitals in the bottom tercile of charity care prior to 
the sample period increase charity care provided, those at the top seem to decrease it (though the results 
are statistically insignificant). As a result of these two trends, the gap between the top and bottom 
nonprofit hospitals narrows substantially after adoption of the MCCP policy. In 2009, there is a 2.9 
percentage point gap in share of patients receiving charity care between the top and bottom terciles of 
nonprofit hospitals. By 2015 that gap is less than 1.3 percentage points. Similarly, the gap in the share of 
revenues spent on charity care falls from over 2.2 percentage points to 1.2. Narrowing of the differences 
between “generous” and “ungenerous” nonprofit hospitals with respect to charity care provided was one 
of our most persistent results. 
Our results contribute to previous work that also finds that MCCP laws do not create sufficient 
incentives for most nonprofit hospitals to provide greater community benefits (Kennedy et al. 2010). In 
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part, it seems this is because most nonprofits are already clearing the accountability benchmarks. Our 
results, in fact, suggest that Kennedy and colleagues (2010) may actually overestimate the intended 
effects of MCCP laws in Texas, because the comparison group included hospitals that provide high levels 
of charity care prior to MCCP provisions – a group we find decreasing charity care over time relative to 
other hospitals unaffected by the law (government and for-profits). The fact that Kennedy and 
colleagues (2010) still find null effects provides further evidence that MCCP laws may not have the 
consequences policymakers intend. These findings, taken together, help address a gap in the literature by 
providing insights on the ongoing debate on effectiveness of charity care requirements. Our results 
provide insights on the potential consequences – both intended and unintended – of expanding the 
community benefit obligations of tax-exempt hospitals. Our results also offer useful insight into the 
effectiveness of similar legislation. 
Importantly then, while the MCCP law does not affect average charity care provision in nonprofit 
hospitals, the heterogeneity in effects may have substantial distributional consequences. For example, 
MCCP laws may affect equity because only a few nonprofit hospitals ramp up charity care (while others 
seem to decrease it), and poor people living near those hospitals may benefit. Nonprofit hospitals that 
provide low levels of charity care before MCCP disproportionately locate in smaller counties with higher 
proportions of older, native-born, white, non-Hispanic residents. The poor residents of these counties 
may benefit from the MCCP policy. Conversely, nonprofit hospitals that provide high levels of charity 
care at baseline are disproportionately located in large counties, especially Cook County (Chicago). 
These hospitals, as a result, serve a more racially and ethnically diverse population (evidenced by county 
and patient characteristics). A higher share of their county residents have very little education (less than 
high school) or very high levels of education (bachelor or graduate). The poor residents of these counties 
seem to be harmed by the MCCP law due to reductions in charity care provided by their nonprofit 
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hospitals. Which geographic areas have greater unmet need and/or demand for charity care is an 
important efficiency and equity concern that is beyond the scope of this current work. Future research 
should further unpack the differences in the populations served by various nonprofit hospitals to shed 
light on the consequences of MCCP laws for hospital finances and viability as well as quality of patient 
care and their health outcomes. 
This paper provides useful insight into the potential consequences – both intended and 
unintended – of further expansions of community benefit requirements for tax-exempt hospitals and 
holding nonprofit hospitals accountable for them. In the era of the ACA, states and the federal 
government seek to hold hospitals accountable for their provision of community health benefits and, 
specifically, charity care. Laws aimed at increasing charity care provided by hospitals are increasingly 
common in an attempt to hold nonprofit hospitals more accountable for fulfilling their social mission and 
addressing broader community health needs. Our findings, taken together, show that Illinois’ MCCP law 
was ineffective if the goal was increasing charity care overall, suggesting that setting low accountability 
benchmarks will not increase community benefits. Our results, thus, pour cold water on further expansion 
of MCCP policies to serve this purpose. Still, we also find that certain hospitals that otherwise provide 
particularly low levels of charity care respond positively to the MCCP accountability policy.  
  
26 
 
References 
American Hospital Association, 2017. “Results from 2013 Tax-Exempt Hospitals’ Schedule H 
Community Benefit Reporting.” Prepared by Ernst & Young LLP. Retrieved from 
https://www.aha.org/system/files/content/17/2013-schedule-h-report.pdf on June 23, 2019.  
American Hospital Association, 2019. “Fast facts on U.S. Hospitals from AHA Hospital Statistics.” 
Retrieved from https://www.aha.org/statistics/fast-facts-us-hospitals on June 23, 2019.  
Amirkhanyan, Anna A., Hyun Joon Kim, and Kristina T. Lambright. "Does the Public Sector Outperform 
the Nonprofit and For‐profit Sectors? Evidence from a National Panel Study on Nursing Home 
quality and Access." Journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management 27, 
no. 2 (2008): 326-353. 
Amirkhanyan, Anna A., Kenneth J. Meier, Laurence J. O’Toole Jr, Mueen A. Dakhwe, and Shawn Janzen. 
"Management and performance in US nursing homes." Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 28, no. 1 (2017): 33-49. 
Arrington, Barbara, and Cynthia Carter Haddock. "Who Really Profits from Not-for-profits?." Health 
Services Research 25, no. 2 (1990): 291. 
Bardach, Eugene, and Cara Lesser. "Accountability in Human Services Collaboratives—for What? and 
to Whom?." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 6, no. 2 (1996): 197-224. 
Barniv, Ran, Kreag Danvers, and Joanne P. Healy-Burress. "An Empirical Examination of State and Local 
Revocations of Tax-exempt Status for Nonprofit Hospitals." Journal of the American Taxation 
Association 27, no. 2 (2005): 1-25. 
Bazzoli, Gloria J., Jan P. Clement, and Hui-Min Hsieh. "Community Benefit Activities of Private, 
Nonprofit Hospitals." Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 35, no. 6 (2010): 999-1026. 
Benjamin, Lehn M., and Paul L. Posner. "Tax Expenditures and Accountability: The Case of the 
Ambivalent Principals." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 28, no. 4 
(2018): 569-582. 
Ben‐Ner, Avner, and Theresa Van Hoomissen. "Nonprofit Organizations in the Mixed 
Economy." Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 62, no. 4 (1991): 519-550. 
27 
 
Bozeman, Barry, and Stuart Bretschneider. "The “Publicness Puzzle” in Organization Theory: A Test of 
Alternative Explanations of Differences Between Public and Private Organizations." Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory 4, no. 2 (1994): 197-224. 
Clement, Jan P., Kenneth R. White, and Vivian Valdmanis. "Charity Care: Do Not-for-profits Influence 
For-profits?." Medical Care Research and Review 59, no. 1 (2002): 59-78. 
Dicke, Lisa A., and J. Steven Ott. "Public Agency Accountability in Human Services Contracting." Public 
Productivity & Management Review (1999): 502-516. 
Dubnick, Melvin J., and H. George Frederickson. "Accountable Agents: Federal Performance 
Measurement and Third-party Government." Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 20, no. suppl_1 (2009): i143-i159. 
Ferris, James M., and Elizabeth A. Graddy. "Structural Changes in the Hospital Industry, Charity Care, 
and the Nonprofit Role in Health Care." Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 28, no. 1 
(1999): 18-31. 
Figlio, David N., and Maurice E. Lucas. "What's in a Grade? School Report Cards and the Housing 
Market." American Economic Review 94, no. 3 (2004): 591-604. 
Ginn, Gregory O., and Charles B. Moseley. "The Impact of State Community Benefit Laws on the 
Community Health Orientation and Health Promotion Services of Hospitals." Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy and Law 31, no. 2 (2006): 321-344. 
Gray, Bradford H., and Mark Schlesinger. "Charitable Expectations of Nonprofit Hospitals: Lessons 
from Maryland." Health Affairs 28, no. 5 (2009): w809-w821. 
Gruber, Jonathan. "The Effect of Competitive Pressure on Charity: Hospital Responses to Price 
Shopping in California." Journal of Health Economics 13, no. 2 (1994): 183-211. 
Hansmann, Henry. "The Effect of tax Exemption and Other Factors on the Market Share of Nonprofit 
versus For-profit Firms." National Tax Journal 40, no. 1 (1987): 71-82. 
Heinrich, Carolyn J. "Third-party Governance under No Child Left Behind: Accountability and 
Performance Management Challenges." Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 20, no. suppl_1 (2009): i59-i80. 
Hellinger, Fred Joseph. "Tax-exempt Hospitals and Community Benefits: A Review of State Reporting 
Requirements." Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 34, no. 1 (2009): 37-61. 
28 
 
Herzlinger, Regina E., and William S. Krasker. "Who Profits from Nonprofits?." Harvard Business 
Review 65, no. 1 (1987): 93. 
Hilltop Institute, 2019. “State Community Benefit Requirements and Tax Exemptions for Nonprofit 
Hospitals.” Retrieved from https://hilltopinstitute.org/our-work/hospital-community-
benefit/hcbp-state-comparison/  
on June 23, 2019. 
Howard, Christopher. "Tax Expenditures." In The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New 
Governance, edited by Lester M. Salamon and Odus V. Elliott, 410–44. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002. 
Hsieh, Hui-Min, Dolores G. Clement, and Gloria J. Bazzoli. "Impacts of Market and Organizational 
Characteristics on Hospital Efficiency and Uncompensated care." Health Care Management 
Review 35, no. 1 (2010): 77-87. 
Illinois Income Tax Act, S.B. 2194, codified at 35 ILCS 5/223(a) (2012). 
Illinois Property Tax Code, S.B. 2194, codified at 35 ILCS 200/15-86(c)(2012). 
IRS (Intern. Rev. Serv.). 2018. Schedule H Form 990. Washington, DC. Retrieved from 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990sh.pdf on June 23, 2019. 
Jin, Ginger Zhe, and Phillip Leslie. "The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from 
Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 2 (2003): 
409-451. 
Jin, Ginger Zhe, and Phillip Leslie. "Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene." American 
Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1, no. 1 (2009): 237-67. 
Johansen, Morgen, and Ling Zhu. "Market Competition, Political Constraint, and Managerial Practice in 
Public, Nonprofit, and Private American Hospitals." Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory 24, no. 1 (2013): 159-184. 
Johnston, Jocelyn M., and Barbara S. Romzek. "Contracting and Accountability in State Medicaid 
Reform: Rhetoric, Theories, and Reality." Public Administration Review (1999): 383-399. 
Keeler, Emmett B., Glenn Melnick, and Jack Zwanziger. "The Changing Effects of Competition on Non-
profit and For-profit Hospital Pricing Behavior." Journal of Health Economics 18, no. 1 (1999): 
69-86. 
29 
 
Kennedy, Frances A., Laurie L. Burney, Jennifer L. Troyer, and J. Caleb Stroup. "Do Non-profit Hospitals 
Provide More Charity Care When Faced with a Mandatory Minimum Standard? Evidence from 
Texas." Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 29, no. 3 (2010): 242-258. 
Kettl, Donald F. "Managing Indirect government." In The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New 
Governance, edited by Lester M. Salamon and Odus V. Elliott, 410–44. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002. 
Mann, Joyce, Glenn Melnick, Anil Bamezai, and Jack Zwanziger. "Uncompensated Care: Hospitals' 
Responses to Fiscal Pressures." Health Affairs 14, no. 1 (1995): 263-270. 
McCambridge, Ruth. (June 26, 2019). “Congress, you paying attention? Hospital billing practices belie 
nonprofit status.” Nonprofit Quarterly. Retrieved from 
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/congress-you-paying-attention-hospital-billing-practices-belie-
nonprofit-status/ on September 17, 2019. 
Morrisey, Michael A., Gerald J. Wedig, and Mahmud Hassan. "Do Nonprofit Hospitals Pay Their Way? 
Data from California Shed light on Whether the Benefit from Nonprofit Hospitals Warrants 
Their Special Tax Status." Health Affairs 15, no. 4 (1996): 132-144. 
Musgrave, R. A. and P. B. Musgrave. Public Finance in Theory and Practice. New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1980. 
Nicholson, Sean, Mark V. Pauly, Lawton R. Burns, Agnieshka Baumritter, and David A. Asch. 
"Measuring Community Benefits Provided By For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals: Nonprofits 
Appear to be Falling Short of Providing the Expected Level of Community Benefits, According 
to this New Model." Health Affairs 19, no. 6 (2000): 168-177. 
Noble, Alice A., Andrew L. Hyams, and Nancy M. Kane. "Charitable hospital accountability: A review 
and analysis of legal and policy initiatives." The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 26, no. 2 
(1998): 116-137. 
Norton, Edward C., and Douglas O. Staiger. "How Hospital Ownership Affects Access to Care for the 
Uninsured." The Rand Journal of Economics (1994): 171-185. 
Perry, James L., and Hal G. Rainey. "The Public-private Distinction in Organization Theory: A Critique 
and Research Strategy." Academy of Management Review 13, no. 2 (1988): 182-201. 
30 
 
Posner, Paul L. "Accountability Challenges of Third Party Governance." The Tools of Government, 
Oxford University Press, New York, United States (2002). 
Provena Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 925 N.E.2d 1131, 236 Ill. 2d 368, 2010 Ill. LEXIS 
289, 339 Ill. Dec. 10 (Ill. Mar. 18, 2010). 
Rainey, Hal G., and Barry Bozeman. "Comparing Public and Private Organizations: Empirical Research 
and the Power of the A Priori." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10, no. 2 
(2000): 447-470. 
Rockoff, Jonah, and Lesley J. Turner. "Short-run Impacts of Accountability on School Quality." 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2, no. 4 (2010): 119-47. 
Romzek, Barbara S., and Jocelyn M. Johnston. "State Social Services Contracting: Exploring the 
Determinants of Effective Contract Accountability." Public Administration Review 65, no. 4 
(2005): 436-449. 
Rosenbaum, Sara, David A. Kindig, Jie Bao, Maureen K. Byrnes, and Colin O’Laughlin. "The Value of the 
Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption was $24.6 billion in 2011." Health Affairs 34, no. 7 (2015): 
1225-1233. 
Rosenthal, Elizabeth. (December 16, 2013). “Benefits questioned in tax breaks for nonprofit 
hospitals.” The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/us/benefits-questioned-in-tax-breaks-for-nonprofit-
hospitals.html on September 17, 2019. 
Rothbart, Michah W., Amy Ellen Schwartz, Thad D. Calabrese, Zachary Papper, Todor Mijanovich, 
Rachel Meltzer, and Diana Silver. "What a Difference a Grade Makes: Evidence from New York 
City's Restaurant Grading Policy." Public Administration Review, 2019. 
Salamon, Lester M. Partners in Public Service: Government-nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare 
State. JHU Press, 1995. 
Sanders, Susan M. "Measuring Charitable Contributions: Implications for the Nonprofit Hospitals Tax-
exempt Status." Journal of Healthcare Management 38, no. 3 (1993): 401. 
Sanders, Susan M. "The “Common sense” of the Nonprofit Hospital Tax Exemption: A Policy 
Analysis." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 14, no. 3 (1995): 446-466. 
Schneider, H., & Yilmaz, H. (2013). Hospital Community Benefits and the Effect of Schedule H: A 
Difference-in-Difference Approach. Health, 5(10), 1681. 
31 
 
Schneider, Helen. "Paying their way? Do Nonprofit Hospitals Justify Their Favorable Tax 
Treatment?." Inquiry: The Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision, and Financing 44, 
no. 2 (2007): 187-199. 
Sloan, Frank A. "Not-for-profit Ownership and Hospital Behavior." Handbook of Health Economics 1 
(2000): 1141-1174. 
Sutton, Janet P., and Jeffrey Stensland. "Promoting Accountability: Hospital Charity Care in California, 
Washington and Texas." Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved 15, no. 2 
(2004): 237-250. 
Thorpe, Kenneth E., and Charles E. Phelps. "The Social Role of Not‐for‐profit Organizations: Hospital 
Provision of Charity Care." Economic Inquiry 29, no. 3 (1991): 472-484. 
U.S. GAO (Gen. Acc. Off.). 2008. Nonprofit Hospitals: Variation in Standards and Guidance Limits 
Comparison of How Hospitals Meet Community Benefit Requirements. Washington, DC: U.S. 
GAO. Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08880.pdf on June 23, 2019. 
Van Slyke, David M. "Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the Government-nonprofit 
Social Service Contracting Relationship." Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 17, no. 2 (2006): 157-187. 
Weisbrod, Burton A., and Mark Schlesinger. "Public, Private, Nonprofit Ownership and the Response to 
Asymmetric Information: The Case of Nursing Homes." In The Economics of Nonprofit 
Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy. Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Young, Gary J., Chia-Hung Chou, Jeffrey Alexander, Shoou-Yih Daniel Lee, and Eli Raver. "Provision of 
Community Benefits by Tax-exempt US Hospitals." New England Journal of Medicine 368, no. 
16 (2013): 1519-1527.  
32 
 
Tables 
Table 1. Hospital and County Characteristics, Hospitals Continuously Operating 2009-2015, Characteristics in 2009 
 
 
Full Sample 
(1) 
Analytic Sample 
(2) 
Excluded 
Sample 
 NP FP GOV 
Hospital 
 Mean Hospital Revenue ($) 
 Mean Patients 
 Mean Bed Number  
 Share Spent on Charity Care (%) 
 Share Patients receiving Charity Care (%) 
 
168,581,705 
134,330 
181 
1.92 
2.13 
 
201,427,089 
158,802 
214 
2.14 
2.43 
 
98,741,867 
58,087 
107 
1.23 
1.61 
 
34,800,385 
43,195 
50 
1.10 
0.87 
 
191,570,807 
114,341 
222 
1.87 
3.88 
  Number of Hospitals 105 82 6 17 40 
County 
  Population 
  Per capita Income ($) 
 
Female (%) 
 
Age under 18 (%) 
 Age over 65(%) 
 
White (%) 
Black (%) 
Other (%) 
 
Hispanic (%) 
 
Born Abroad (%) 
 
Speak English Less than “very well” (%)  
 
 
1,314,695 
28,156 
 
50.67 
 
23.76 
14.07 
 
80.99 
10.35 
8.65 
 
9.03 
 
0.81 
 
5.70 
 
 
1,475,299 
28,667 
 
50.78 
 
24.02 
13.67 
 
78.93 
11.71 
9.35 
 
9.79 
 
0.86 
 
6.25 
 
 
2,766,476 
31,246 
 
50.55 
 
24.52 
11.63 
 
70.60 
14.83 
14.53 
 
16.07 
 
1.15 
 
10.47 
 
 
27,624 
24,601 
 
50.15 
 
22.28 
16.85 
 
94.61 
2.21 
3.18 
 
2.88 
 
0.46 
 
1.36 
 
 
2,797,202 
30,957 
 
50.80 
 
24.35 
12.54 
 
69.61 
16.19 
14.19 
 
14.70 
 
1.16 
 
9.88 
 
33 
 
Table 1. Hospital and County Characteristics, Hospitals Continuously Operating 2009-2015, Characteristics in 2009 
(Continued) 
 (1) (2) 
 
Analytic Sample 
Excluded 
Sample 
Full Sample NP FP GOV  
Less High School (%) 14.25 14.00 15.27 15.07 15.14 
High School (%)  32.26 31.35 28.23 38.07 27.93 
Some College (%)  29.44 29.37 26.60 30.82 27.45 
 Bachelor (%)  15.21 15.96 18.08 10.56 18.16 
Graduate (%)  8.84 9.32 11.82 5.47 11.33 
      
Below 100 percent Poverty Level (%)  13.56 13.62 14.15 13.09 13.50 
100 to 149 percent Poverty Level (%) 8.62 8.51 8.47 9.18 8.39 
At or above 149 percent Poverty Level (%) 77.83 77.88 77.38 77.73 78.11 
      
Unemployment (%) 7.84 7.95 8.43 7.11 8.10 
Number of Counties 58 42 4 15 17 
 
Note: Analytic sample includes observations of general hospitals in years with audited financial statements and information on charity care provisions. All dollars are reported 
in 2015 dollars using urban CPI. There are 4 counties (Cook, Bureau, Lake, Randolph) with two types of hospital ownership type, and hospitals only in Cook counties 
consistently exist across the years. Three hospitals changed ownership type (one changed FP to NP, one from GOV to NP, one from GOV to NP and back) within our analytic 
sample. We have three hospitals (four observations) with missing ownership type information within our analytic sample. For each of the hospital with missing ownership type, 
we used other years’ ownership information to assign ownership type. We remove 1 hospital with implausibly large charity care provisions. Results are not sensitive to 
excluding those observations all together. 
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Table 2. Regression Results, Relationship Between Ownership Type and Charity Care Provision, Pre-Policy, 2009-2011 
Variables Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
NP 2.066*** 1.294*** 1.578*** -0.005 1.354*** 0.947*** 1.014*** -0.980*** 
 (0.407) (0.384) (0.487) (0.370) (0.236) (0.224) (0.247) (0.129) 
FP 0.354 -0.954 -1.486 -3.724 -0.446 -0.964* -1.148* -3.499*** 
 (0.746) (1.022) (1.339) (2.572) (0.462) (0.550) (0.614) (1.085) 
         
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County Controls NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Hospital Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
County FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
         
NP - FP 1.712** 2.248** 3.064** 3.719 1.800*** 1.911*** 2.162*** 2.519** 
Counties 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Hospitals 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
Observations 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 315 
R-squared 0.067 0.155 0.183 0.286 0.156 0.233 0.244 0.380 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered by hospitals in parentheses. Continuously operating general hospitals (from 2009-2015). Sample includes 
observations in years with audited financial statements and information on charity care provided. County controls in all models include population, share of 
population age under 18 & age over 65, share of population born abroad, gender (male is omitted category), race (White is omitted category), Hispanic, 
foreign-born population, English-speaking ability, educational attainment (less than high school is omitted category), poverty status (below 100 percent of 
the poverty level is omitted category), unemployment rate, per capita income (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). Hospital controls in all models 
include authorized bed number and natural log of revenue (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). NP-FP indicates point estimates using a post-
estimation F-statistic. Reference group = government hospitals. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01  
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Table 3. Regression Results, Impact of Minimum Charity Care Law, Difference-in-Differences Model, 2009-2015 
Variables Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
NPPost 0.187 0.087 0.062 0.0532 -0.081 0.167 0.090 0.087 0.287 0.167 
 (0.311) (0.320) (0.319) (0.342) (0.316) (0.160) (0.174) (0.173) (0.191) (0.163) 
NP 1.976*** 1.006*** 1.213*** -0.212 0.321 1.326*** 0.938*** 0.981*** -0.439 1.015 
 (0.405) (0.353) (0.402) (0.270) (0.280) (0.232) (0.229) (0.239) (0.454) (1.295) 
FP -0.024 -1.422 -1.860 -4.600** -0.973* -0.565 -1.137** -1.288** -2.943*** 0.363 
 (0.664) (1.009) (1.225) (2.016) (0.525) (0.343) (0.459) (0.527) (0.896) (1.312) 
           
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County Controls NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Hospital Controls NO NO YES YES YES NO NO YES YES YES 
County FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Hospital FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
           
Counties 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Hospitals 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
Observations 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 
R-squared 0.083 0.195 0.219 0.311 0.798 0.191 0.251 0.261 0.376 0.792 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by hospitals in parentheses. Continuously operating general hospitals (from 2009-2015). Sample includes 
observations in years with audited financial statements and information on charity care provided. County controls in all models include population, share of 
population age under 18 & age over 65, share of population born abroad, gender (male is omitted category), race (White is omitted category), Hispanic, 
foreign-born population, English-speaking ability, educational attainment (less than high school is omitted category), poverty status (below 100 percent of 
the poverty level is omitted category), unemployment rate, per capita income (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). Hospital controls in all models 
include authorized bed number and natural log of revenue (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). Reference group = government hospitals. * p<0.1 ** 
p<0.05 *** p<0.01  
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Table 4. Test of Parallel Trend Assumption (Pre-Policy, 2009-2011) and Placebo Test (Impact Year Before Policy), 2009-2015 
Variables Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
NPPretrend 0.394 0.347    0.296* 0.307    
 (0.259) (0.334)    (0.154) (0.195)    
NPfakePost   0.423 0.501 0.324   0.351 0.426* 0.294 
   (0.393) (0.430) (0.352)   (0.233) (0.247) (0.227) 
NPPost   -0.220 -0.271 -0.288   -0.147 0.012 -0.020 
   (0.322) (0.346) (0.363)   (0.230) (0.230) (0.233)  
NP 2.367*** 0.689 1.074** -0.385 0.207 1.608*** -0.365 0.866*** -0.586 0.911 
 (0.696) (0.800) (0.456) (0.332) (0.304) (0.405) (0.443) (0.256) (0.473) (1.305) 
FP -1.497 -3.759 -1.860 -4.607** -1.076** -1.156* -3.529*** -1.288** -2.949*** 0.270 
 (1.338) (2.564) (1.226) (2.016) (0.528) (0.610) (1.060) (0.528) (0.895) (1.319) 
           
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Hospital Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County FE NO YES NO YES NO NO YES NO YES NO 
Hospital FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
           
Counties 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Hospitals 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
Observations 315 315 733 733 733 315 315 733 733 733 
R-squared 0.185 0.287 0.219 0.311 0.799 0.247 0.383 0.262 0.377 0.792 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by hospitals in parentheses. Continuously operating general hospitals (from 2009-2015). Sample includes observations in years 
with audited financial statements and information on charity care provided. County controls in all models include population, share of population age under 18 & age over 65, 
share of population born abroad, gender (male is omitted category), race (White is omitted category), Hispanic, foreign-born population, English-speaking ability, educational 
attainment (less than high school is omitted category), poverty status (below 100 percent of the poverty level is omitted category), unemployment rate, per capita income 
(all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). Hospital controls in all models include authorized bed number and natural log of revenue (all reported in 2015 dollars using 
urban CPI). Reference group = government hospitals. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
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Table 5. Heterogeneity of Impacts by Baseline Charity Care Provisions 
Variables Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care  Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Post: NP*Top -0.186 -0.130 -0.162 -0.257 -0.228 -0.131 -0.106 -0.092 -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.430) (0.424) (0.421) (0.434) (0.449) (0.186) (0.200) (0.203) (0.204) (0.208) 
 NP*Middle 0.093 0.094 0.092 -0.104 -0.068 -0.002 -0.022 -0.023 0.048 0.067 
 (0.399) (0.439) (0.440) (0.455) (0.458) (0.198) (0.226) (0.226) (0.234) (0.242) 
 NP*Bottom 0.390 0.392 0.391 0.197 0.201 0.455*** 0.476*** 0.471*** 0.483*** 0.488*** 
 (0.355) (0.386) (0.388) (0.369) (0.380) (0.139) (0.168) (0.169) (0.160) (0.162) 
NP*Top 3.355*** 2.413*** 2.711*** 3.134**  2.392*** 2.142*** 2.238*** 1.393***  
 (0.720) (0.680) (0.691) (1.251)  (0.346) (0.341) (0.344) (0.527)  
NP*Middle 1.673** 1.011 1.215 0.527  1.186*** 0.940*** 0.942*** -0.744**  
 (0.711) (0.675) (0.758) (1.344)  (0.231) (0.278) (0.287) (0.349)  
NP*Bottom 0.802** 0.042 0.156 -0.459  0.283 0.014 0.022 -1.387***  
 (0.367) (0.541) (0.540) (0.289)  (0.243) (0.259) (0.262) (0.0988)  
FP 1.299 0.036 -0.429 -0.930  0.271 -0.129 -0.307 -1.149  
 (1.520) (1.554) (1.656) (2.832)  (0.970) (0.991) (1.003) (1.684)  
           
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County Controls NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Hospital Controls NO NO YES YES YES NO NO YES YES YES 
County FE NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Hospital FE NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
           
Post: NP*Top – NP*Middle -0.279 -0.224 -0.254 -0.153 -0.16 -0.129 -0.084 -0.069 -0.063 -0.079 
 NP*Top – NP*Bottom -0.576 -0.522 -0.553 -0.454 -0.429 -0.586*** -0.582*** -0.563*** -0.498** -0.500** 
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Table 5. Heterogeneity of Impacts by Baseline Charity Care Provisions (Continued) 
Variables Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 NP*Middle – NP*Bottom -0.297 -0.298 -0.299 -0.301 -0.269 -0.457** -0.498** -0.494** -0.435* -0.421* 
Counties 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 
Hospitals 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
Observations 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 733 
R-squared 0.133 0.223 0.248 0.349 0.799 0.300 0.337 0.356 0.484 0.794 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by hospitals in parentheses. Continuously operating general hospitals (from 2009-2015). Sample includes 
observations in years with audited financial statements and information on charity care provided. County controls in all models include population, share of 
population age under 18 & age over 65, share of population born abroad, gender (male is omitted category), race (White is omitted category), Hispanic, 
foreign-born population, English-speaking ability, educational attainment (less than high school is omitted category), poverty status (below 100 percent of 
the poverty level is omitted category), unemployment rate, per capita income (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). Hospital controls in all models 
include authorized bed number and natural log of revenue (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). “NP*Top” indicates top tercile > 1.82% of health 
services, “NP*Middle” indicates middle tercile 1.29% – 1.82% of health services, “NP*Bottom” indicates bottom tercile < 1.29% of health services spent on 
charity care. Reference group = government hospitals. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01  
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Figures 
Figure 1. Panel A. Event Study, Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care, 2009-
2015 
 
Figure 1. Panel B. Event Study, Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care, 
2009-2015 
 
Note: Continuously operating general hospitals (from 2009-2015). Sample includes observations in years with 
audited financial statements and information on charity care provided.
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Figure 2. Panel A. Event Study Results, Heterogeneity of Impacts by Baseline Charity 
Care Provisions, Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care, 2009-2015 
 
Figure 2. Panel B. Event Study Results, Heterogeneity of Impacts by Baseline Charity 
Care Provisions, Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care, 2009-2015 
 
Note: “NP*Top” indicates top tercile > 1.82% of health services, “NP*Middle” indicates middle tercile 1.29% – 
1.82% of health services, “NP*Bottom” indicates bottom tercile < 1.29% of health services spent on charity care. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Share of Hospital Ownership, Analytic Sample, 2009-2015 
Ownership Ownership sub-type 
Share (%) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
NP 
Church-Related 20.95 23.81 23.81 22.86 22.12 20.19 18.10 
Not For Profit 
Corporation 
55.24 51.43 53.33 53.33 52.88 51.92 54.29 
Other Not For Profit 1.90 3.81 1.90 2.86 4.81 8.65 7.62 
(NP total) 78.09 79.05 79.04 79.05 79.81 80.76 80.01 
         
FP For Profit Corporation 5.71 4.76 4.76 4.76 4.81 4.81 4.76 
         
GOV 
City 2.86 2.86 2.86 2.86 2.88 1.92 1.90 
County 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 
Township 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 
Hospital District 11.43 10.48 10.48 11.43 10.58 10.58 10.48 
Other Governmental 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.95 
(GOV total) 16.19 15.24 15.24 16.19 15.38 14.42 15.23 
Total Number of count: 733 
Note:  We assigned hospital ownership type based on the information from the AHQ survey. The ownership type 
is mutually exclusive. Three hospitals changed ownership type (one hospital changed from FP to NP, one hospital 
changed from GOV to NP, one hospital changed from GOV to NP, then from NP to GOV) within our analytic 
sample.
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Appendix 2. Event Study, 2009-2015 
VARIABLES Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care  
 (1) (2) 
NP   
.    2009 -0.802 -0.641** 
 (0.489) (0.309) 
   2010 -0.030 -0.050 
 (0.377) (0.240) 
   2012 -0.008 0.043 
 (0.263) (0.222) 
   2013 0.304 0.385 
 (0.425) (0.251) 
   2014 -0.413 -0.416 
 (0.460) (0.320) 
   2015 -0.805* -0.644** 
 (0.425) (0.255) 
Year   
   2009 0.072 0.036 
 (0.426) (0.297) 
   2010 0.013 -0.144 
 (0.269) (0.220) 
   2012 0.205 0.005 
 (0.213) (0.193) 
   2013 0.406 -0.249 
 (0.397) (0.248) 
   2014 0.396 -0.030 
 (0.454) (0.330) 
   2015 0.170 -0.447 
 (0.478) (0.292) 
   
NP 1.500*** 1.219*** 
 (0.413) (0.278) 
FP -1.874 -1.300** 
 (1.228) (0.526) 
   
Year FE YES YES 
County Controls YES YES 
Hospital Controls YES YES 
County FE NO NO 
Hospital FE NO NO 
   
Counties 58 58 
Hospitals 105 105 
Observations 733 733 
R-squared 0.221 0.269 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by hospitals in parentheses. Continuously operating general hospitals (from 2009-
2015). Sample includes observations in years with audited financial statements and information on charity care provided. 
County controls in all models include population, share of population age under 18 & age over 65, share of population born 
abroad, gender (male is omitted category), race (White is omitted category), Hispanic, foreign-born population, English-
speaking ability, educational attainment (less than high school is omitted category), poverty status (below 100 percent of the 
poverty level is omitted category), unemployment rate, per capita income (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). 
Hospital controls in all models include authorized bed number and natural log of revenue (all reported in 2015 dollars using 
urban CPI). Omitted category is nonprofit hospitals in 2011. Reference group = government hospitals.  * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** 
p<0.01   
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 Appendix 3. Heterogeneity in Treatment by Baseline Charity Care Provisions 
VARIABLES Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care Percentage of Health Services Spent on Charity Care  
 (1) (2) 
NP_Top   
   2009 1.269 0.779* 
 (1.139) (0.414) 
   2010 1.384 0.964* 
 (1.101) (0.528) 
   2011 1.376 1.132** 
 (1.072) (0.482) 
   2012 1.346 1.077** 
 (1.108) (0.517) 
   2013 2.209* 1.509*** 
 (1.319) (0.553) 
   2014 0.966 0.613 
 (1.113) (0.524) 
   2015 0.197 0.255 
 (1.162) (0.473) 
NP_Middle   
   2009 -0.438 -0.583** 
 (0.428) (0.250) 
   2010 -0.033 -0.434 
 (0.426) (0.318) 
   2012 0.048 -0.064 
 (0.458) (0.312) 
   2013 0.446 0.215 
 (0.577) (0.330) 
   2014 -0.074 -0.690* 
 (0.617) (0.393) 
   2015 -0.703 -0.928** 
 (0.570) (0.388) 
NP_Bottom   
   2009 -1.610* -1.452*** 
 (0.890) (0.361) 
   2010 -0.822 -1.299*** 
 (1.108) (0.434) 
   2011 -1.215 -1.033*** 
 (0.871) (0.372) 
   2012 -0.779 -0.918** 
 (0.923) (0.415) 
   2013 -0.689 -0.530 
 (0.954) (0.453) 
   2014 -0.770 -0.753 
 (0.960) (0.462) 
   2015 -1.076 -0.973** 
 (0.915) (0.407) 
Year   
   2009 -0.251 -0.053 
 (0.373) (0.193) 
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Appendix 3. Heterogeneity in Treatment by Baseline Charity Care Provisions 
(Continued) 
VARIABLES 
 
Percentage of Patients Receiving Charity Care 
(1) 
Percentage of Health Services Spent of Charity Care 
(2) 
   2010 -0.043 0.103 
 (0.299) (0.269) 
   2012 0.034 0.003 
 (0.281) (0.191) 
   2013 0.121 -0.273 
 (0.438) (0.226) 
   2014 -0.004 -0.186 
 (0.501) (0.307) 
   2015 -0.117 -0.589* 
 (0.483) (0.314) 
   
FP -0.430 -0.309 
 (1.673) (1.015) 
NP 1.372* 1.285*** 
 (0.790) (0.377) 
   
Year FE YES YES 
County Controls YES YES 
Hospital Controls YES YES 
County FE NO NO 
Hospital FE NO NO 
   
Counties 58 58 
Hospitals 105 105 
Observations 733 733 
R-squared 0.253 0.366 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by hospitals in parentheses. Continuously operating general hospitals 
(from 2009-2015). Sample includes observations in years with audited financial statements and information on 
charity care provided. County controls in all models include population, share of population age under 18 & age 
over 65, share of population born abroad, gender (male is omitted category), race (White is omitted category), 
Hispanic, foreign-born population, English-speaking ability, educational attainment (less than high school is 
omitted category), poverty status (below 100 percent of the poverty level is omitted category), unemployment 
rate, per capita income (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). Hospital controls in all models include 
authorized bed number and natural log of revenue (all reported in 2015 dollars using urban CPI). “NP*Top” 
indicates top tercile > 1.82% of health services, “NP*Middle” indicates middle tercile 1.29% – 1.82% of health 
services, “NP*Bottom” indicates bottom tercile < 1.29% of health services spent on charity care. Reference group 
= government hospitals. * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
